Restricting the activity of courts during the coronavirus pandemic and the expiry of procedural deadlines

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has introduced restrictions in many spheres of life. The effects of the pandemic have also reached the judicial system, especially in the matter of the activity of courts. Pursuant to art. 15zzr and art. 15zzs of the 31 March, 2020 Act,  amending the Act on specific solutions related to the preventing, counteracting and combating COVID-19, other infectious diseases and crisis situations caused by them, together with other acts, the course of procedural, court and administrative law deadlines (before the effective date of the Act) has been suspended (or they did not commence at all).  

This restriction was abolished by the Act of May 14, 2020 amending certain Acts regarding protective measures in connection with the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus. Therefore, the above-mentioned provisions were repealed, which resulted in the reinstatement of the court and procedural deadlines, as well as the deadlines provided for by the provisions of administrative law.

Due to this, doubts arose as to the calculation of the expiry of such deadlines. It is indisputable that the regulation, which was to facilitate the organization of work in the judiciary, raised a number of doubts, the effects of which are just beginning to appear.

This is evidenced by the example of the case pending before the Supreme Court, in which the Court decided to uphold the challenged order, which refused to accept the personal cassation of sentenced G. C. in the case ended with the judgment of the District Court in N. of February 11, 2020, file ref. II Ka (…), where the convict argued the delay in submitting the cassation appeal on the grounds that due to the state of the pandemic, he did not know "when to submit the pleading because the courts were closed". In its justification, the Court indicated that the pandemic actually limited the activities of the judicial authorities and suspended a number of trial periods. However, this argument was upheld when determining the moment when the convict passed – it was extended on the basis of the relevant provisions because of the epidemic – the time limit for launching the pre-cassation proceedings. Therefore, when deciding on the issue of keeping the deadline for lodging a cassation, the statutory solution protecting the interests of the convicts was taken into account.

All this leads to the conclusion that even when the legislator introduces regulations aimed at facilitating the implementation of citizens’ rights and obligations during a pandemic, there are cases where COVID-19 becomes a way to circumvent the law and existing regulations. Therefore, it should be noted that despite the ongoing pandemic, all time limits resumed after the abolition of the indicated restriction.